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Abstract 
 
Due to the limited communication range of 
wearable devices, there is the need for wearable 
devices to communicate amongst themselves, 
supporting devices and the internet or to the internet. 
Most wearable devices are not internet enabled and 
most often need an internet enabled broker device or 
intermediate device in order to reach the internet. 
For a secure end to end communication between 
these devices security measures like authentication 
must be put in place in other to prevent unauthorised 
access to information given the sensitivity of the 
information collected and transmitted. Therefore, 
there are other existing authentication solutions for 
wearable devices but these solutions actively involve 
from time to time the user of the device which is 
prone to a lot of challenges.  As a solution to these 
challenges, this paper proposes a secure point-to-
point Self-authentication mechanism that involves 
device to device interaction. This work exploits 
existing standards and framework like NFC, PPP, 
EAP etc. in other to achieve a device compatible 
secure authentication protocol amongst wearable 
device and supporting devices.. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The statistics on mobile wearable communication 
is alarming, by 2017 the shipment of mobile 
wearables is projected to reach 70 million and the 
market value of mobile wearable device was 
estimated to be $1.5 in 2014[1].  According to [2], 97 
million wearable devices generated 15 petabytes of 
monthly traffic in 2015. Mobile wearable 
communication is fast becoming a new 
communication paradigm and mobile wearable 
device can be said to use up a reasonable amount of 
bandwidth due to the nature of its application which 
is basically collect, store, interpret, transmit and 
exchange these data (information) over the internet 
or amongst other supporting wearable devices. For 
instance, mobile health wearables measure, monitor 
or collect biomedical information from patients or 
user in real time and this information is transferred to 
the hospital for clinical diagnosis and may be there a 
need for emergency response could be established. 
This medical information is accessed or shared by 
more parties than the picture painted already, parties 
like the government, Medical staff, researchers, 
insurance companies etc. as the case may be. One of  
 
 
the obvious challenges of wearables is the limited 
communication range and attempts are being made to 
address this challenged and this has exposed 
wearables to security and privacy challenges. 
Most wearable devices are not stand-alone device 
as they are more useful when they transmit sensed or 
collected data since most of them cannot process 
these data. These wearables collect, store, interpret, 
transmit and exchange these data (information) over 
the internet or amongst other supporting wearable 
devices. Depending on the application of the mobile 
wearable they store or collect data such as 
temperature, blood pressure, activity tracking, heart 
rate etc. to interpret and make recommendations 
based on these data collected these wearables need to 
share or transmit this data to other supporting device 
or application. The security of the transmitted 
information needs to be guaranteed from point of 
sending to intended receiver due to the sensitive 
nature of information transmitted which could be of 
commercial value, military high secret information 
or a patient’s medical record or health status etc. Due 
to the peculiar characteristic of these mobile 
wearable there are some communication challenges, 
peculiar characteristics like limited memory (there is 
need to transmit to an external device), limited CPU 
power (there is need to transmit to another device 
that would process collected data), mobility 
(transmition needs to be via a secure channel), 
limited battery life (there is a limit to the 
computation these devices can take), connectivity 
range (very limited range of connectivity, there is 
need for communication with other device), limited 
user and device interaction etc.  
The high possibility of these wearables 
communicating with other device have attracted 
some security challenges because the stored data or 
content in transit needs to be protected from 
unauthorised  access, for example, a patient’s 
medical record is private and should only be access 
by authorised persons depending on the situation. In 
a situation of an emergency and a patient’s wearable 
is meant to communicate with his hospital or an 
ambulance via the internet or any other means, the 
device needs to confirm that this information gets to 
the authorised authority and the authority or hospital 
needs to confirm that the information is coming from 
their patient. A secure identification and 
authentication mechanism is essential for the privacy 
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and security of the information shared between the 
wearable device and other supporting device or 
application. This authentication mechanism is meant 
to request, obtain and verify credentials of parties 
before granting access to sensitive data. 
Most authentication solutions present today tend 
to treat the wearable as a token to authenticate other 
device [3, 4], some other solutions are meant for 
scenarios where the device is authenticating with 
participating sensors within the same Body Area 
Network (BAN), some others authenticate the users 
or would need the physical intervention of the users 
in other to authenticate communicating devices. In 
the light of this authentication challenge, this work 
proposes a secure identification and authentication 
mechanism that can authenticate with supporting 
devices remotely with no intervention of the user. 
Most authentication mechanisms require another 
device may be a mobile phone to forward the 
received data from the wearable to other supporting 
device but the proposed mechanism here the 
wearable device authenticates directly against from 
one point to another and another without the mobile 
phone acting as a tunnelling device.  
RFID technologies, NFC are common 
technologies for wearables adopted in other to secure 
or grant authorised access to information but these 
technologies have limitations which is one of the 
main reason why this work proposes the use of 
contactless smart cards (CSCs). Considering the size 
of wearable, CSCs is a small device with a more 
sophisticated computing power with a very limited 
read range which reduces the chances of 
eavesdropping, unlike RFID tags with more read 
range. The power challenge face by these mobile 
wearable devices makes CSCs a preferable option 
due to its Non-volatile memory. 
The rest of this work is divided into four (IV) 
sections with subsections within each section: 
Section two (II) gives a brief review of previous 
related technologies, highlights some possible user 
identification and authentication threats when using a 
mobile wearable device, it also explains some 
authentication techniques meanwhile section three 
(III) categories and explains some of the major 
security and communication requirements for 
wearables, while section four (IV) introduces the 
proposed design while the concluding part of this 
work tends to validate the design and suggest future 
work. 
This section presents related work and briefly 
introduces the technologies to be adopted in the 
proposed design. 
 
2. Related work and Technologies 
 
Wearable devices could be defined as lightweight 
devices with limited storage, constrained 
computation and communication abilities hence, its 
size that is worn by users in other to perform specific 
task mainly sensing and observation [11].  Wearable 
technologies are electronic technologies that are 
designed to be worn on the body and equipped with 
scanning, sensory and communication capabilities. 
The communication capabilities are such that the 
wearable device communicates with a supporting 
device to interpret or display captured data in real 
time due to the limited communication range. 
In the last ten (10) years, the technological 
market has witnessed the influx of wearable device 
with major players like Fitbit, Apple, Samsung, 
Garmin etc. flooding the market with different 
wearable technologies with applications that range 
from fitness to health. These devices come in 
different shapes and sizes and could be worn as 
wristwatches, earphones and as a part of our clothing 
as well [31, 32]. This influx has been fuelled by a lot 
of factors ranging from consumers demand to the 
low cost of sensors and technologies used for the 
manufacturing of wearables, not to mention that all 
wearable are cheap. Another major reason that has 
encouraged the vast deployment of wearable 
technology is the success that has been recorded over 
the years. These successes have been recorded in 
different works of life ranging from medical, 
entertainment, emergency, sport and fitness etc. and 
in the nearest feature wearable would become part of 
our lifestyle. 
As mentioned earlier when the word 
authentication meets wearable devices, what comes 
to mind is the use of wearables as an authentication 
device as seen in the few technologies mentioned in 
[5] Smart jewellery, Smart Watches etc. [6] proposes 
a transient authentication (TA) used in securing 
mobile devices, this authentication mechanism 
comes as solution to the evident characteristic 
security challenges with mobile devices. Mobile 
devices have become more expensive by the day and 
the physical security has become more difficult due 
to the size and the value of these devices have 
increased due to the nature of data that they carry. In 
the light of this TA model was proposed not only to 
secure the mobile device but also provides 
convenience. In TA the wearable device acts like a 
token that constantly attest the users and 
authenticates him as well, this protects the 
information stored in the device and save the user 
from authenticating at all time which can be a bit 
frustrating for users. In the same vein, SEPIA 
(Secure-PIN-Authentication-as-a Service) [7] used 
cloud-connected wearables as an authentication 
device to protect ATM and POS terminals. Here, the 
wearable is used as a QR code scanner which the 
user would scan from the screen of the POS terminal 
in order to obtain a one-time-password that would be 
used for the transaction.  
Recent research efforts have focused on 
improving the connectivity range of wearable 
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devices using more powerful personal devices (e.g., 
mobile phones or tablets) as intermediate devices. 
However, this new communication method also 
opens up new security challenges that should be 
addressed, which involve protecting wearable 
devices from both malicious intermediate devices 
and unauthorised access attempts from other entities 
residing on the Internet. 
 
2.1. Smart Watches 
 
In [5] smart watches were mentioned as an 
authentication device. Wristwatches are worn by 
most people for different purposes other than 
keeping time, based on this the authors exploits the 
fact that the capabilities of the smart watch 
interacting with the user, more storage capabilities 
unlike the iButton, higher processing power etc. all 
these capabilities are requirements for a more secure 
authentication device. There have also been proposed 
mechanisms or technologies that have not treated 
wearables as authentication device rather has 
attempted to propose a solution to the access control 
challenges in mobile wearables. [8] Presents a data 
authentication mechanism for the protecting data 
communication within in a Wireless Body Area 
Network (WBAN), this mechanism doesn’t account 
for data communication with other supporting 
devices outside the network which is the case most 
often. 
 
2.2. Smart Jewellery 
 
The device featured in the article mentioned 
above as the iButton which could be worn as a jewel 
and due to human nature, jewels are worn most of 
the time, therefore, it could be used as a means to 
provide authentication. The iButton is equipped with 
a microprocessor that runs on JVM which can 
communicate with a supporting computer but in this 
case, the jewellery only stores the information or 
credentials needed for identification and 
authentication. 
 
3. Authentication Techniques 
 
Authentication as a process of validating a user’s 
identity using the user’s credentials in other to grant 
access to the user can be achieved in many ways 
depending on the scenario. Multiple factors may be 
included for the preservation of sensitive data or data 
with commercial value. There are quite a number of 
authentication techniques, mechanism and protocols 
out there and the research in this area is still very 
active.  
 
 
 
3.1. Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
MAC message authentication code, this 
technique have successfully been used in data 
authentication [1, 9-11], MAC literally is a code used 
to authenticate a message in other to verify the 
sender and protect the integrity of the message by 
ensuring that the message was not tampered with on 
transit. This is a very popular authentication 
technique that has been adopted over the years in 
other to protect the integrity of data in transit. MAC 
presents a low-cost authentication for data 
communication but this can be safer when 
implemented in a scenarios with very few 
communicating members because when the more the 
communicating members the higher the risk of 
exposure since the secret key would be shared 
amongst communicating members and trying to 
manage key sharing (key management) and 
protection would incur more cost [11]. This 
mechanism is not the most suitable for mobile 
wearables that would be performing data 
communications with a lot of supporting devices. 
 
3.2. Smart Cards 
 
Smart cards are hardware devices used to protect 
sensitive operations such as electronic payments and 
access control. They can store sensitive information 
securely and have cryptographic capabilities.1Smart 
card characteristics, ranging from physical 
characteristics to commands to interact with cards, 
are described in the International Organization for 
Standards/International Electrotechnical Commission 
(ISO/IEC) 7816 standard series. Security and 
commands for information interchange are defined in 
ISO/IEC 7816–4 [8]. 
Traditionally, the use of smart cards has been strictly 
attached to a terminal. Both the terminal and the 
smart card were involved in the authentication 
process, working together as a split-supplicant [4]. 
However, more recent works [9] have proposed 
using a smart card in an autonomous way 
(standalone supplicant) where the card is able to take 
part in the authentication process by itself. This new 
functionality is based on the Java Card technology, 
which allows Java-based applications to be run on 
smart cards, and its autonomy can only be achieved 
if the smart card has connectivity. 
 
3.3. Kerberos 
 
Kerberos protocol (RFC1510) as a security 
system was developed in 1988 at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology as an authentication means 
for secure communication [12]. It has been widely 
adopted but mainly in a wired network but [13] 
proposed a Kerberos-based authentication 
architecture that could be used for authentication in a 
wireless authentication although its characteristics 
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have made it unlikely to be used for this design. 
Kerberos are based on password, which not only 
makes it’s prone to password attacks but not suitable 
for machine to machine communication scenarios. 
For a better overview on Kerberos refer to [12, 14, 
15].  
 
3.4. Location-Based Authentication 
 
This is a new technique or factor for 
authentication that uses the physical location of the 
user to authenticate the user and there are various 
ways to achieve this like using sensors or GPS 
receivers. Location-Based authentication is exposed 
to some challenges such as user mobility and 
position based security attacks like position targeted 
spam. Location-based authentication has attracted 
some research works around it recently and amongst 
the early authors   
 
3.5. Extensible Authentication Protocol 
(EAP) 
 
This is a general authentication protocol that 
provides an interface for specific authentication 
mechanism. These characteristics have made this the 
best option for the proposed design since EAP just 
provides an application with an interface for the 
main authentication mechanism and EAP can also be 
used alongside other protocols like PPP/LCP. EAP 
allows different systems and authentication 
mechanisms to be used and this gives the user the 
liberty of choice to include other authentication 
protocol. This protocol has been used alongside other 
protocols in cases liked EAP-MD5, LEAP,EAP-TLS 
(MS) PEAP etc. the list goes on. EAP presents 
impressive requirements as can be seen in [16]. EAP 
supports Request, Response, Success, and Failure 
message following the PPP authentication model. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Message exchange procedure of EAP 
 
 
 
4. Security Requirements for Wearable 
Technology 
 
Data security and privacy is a critical issue with 
wearable devices, data must be stored securely 
transmitted in a timely manner when needed with no 
interruption and must be accessed or modified only 
by authorised users. It is a critical issue because 
wireless channels for transmitting is not secured due 
to the fact that anyone can interfere, monitor, or even 
participate in a communication in a wireless 
environment as long as they are on the same 
frequency, basically, wireless technology is more 
susceptible to security threats than wired. To ensure 
data security in wearable technology, there are 
various security requirements which should be 
considered in any design of security mechanism. The 
security requirements for wearable devices could be 
categorised into three depending on the three-tier 
architecture illustrated below.  
 
Table 1.  Security requirements for wearable technology 
 
 
 
Table 1 shows the three major security 
requirements for wearables. It is always a challenge 
to satisfy these various security requirements in 
wearables due to the practicability, device usability, 
interoperability and efficiency of these of this device. 
In most cases, researchers would have to prioritise 
these security requirements because some 
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requirements are built around the others which give 
the reason why this research has been based on the 
authentication. The importance of authentication in 
any technology can never be overemphasised, and in 
this case, it is needed for a secure transmission of 
data from one device to another. 
 
4.1. Communication Requirements for 
Wearable Technology 
 
The communication that exist for the design of 
wearable could be divided in to three depending on 
the location of the communicating device, on-body 
communication this is communication between 
sensors or other supporting device on the body, near-
body communication this is communication between 
intermediate device and the wearables, off-body 
communication is the communication between the 
intermediate device and a fixed network 
infrastructure. These categories are further illustrated 
in the picture below. 
 
 
Figure 2. A basic communication architecture for mobile 
wearables 
 
Short Range Wireless Technology 
 
Short Range Wireless Technology has been the most 
successful in terms of growth in wireless technology 
because of its deployment, configuration convenience, low 
power consumption and peer to peer communication. 
SRWT have been applied in different areas such as 
WLAN, WPAN, WBAN and it still remains viable and can 
be explored further. It has been successful in applications 
like Machine-to-Machine communications [16], [17, 18], 
device to device [19, 20] and that influenced the choice of 
for NFC after reviewing other SRWT as could be seen 
below. 
 
4.2. Bluetooth 
 
Bluetooth is a wireless standard developed for 
Short-Range Wireless Technology (SRWT), 
Bluetooth is an IEEE open standard that uses 
Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum Scheme 
(FHSS) in the transmission of data [21, 22]. 
Bluetooth is suitable for point-to-point 
communication devices and has sparked the 
introduction of other device and technology like 
Bluetooth headphones, Bluetooth speakers, 
Bluetooth mouse etc. [23]. 
4.3. Infrared (IrDA) 
 
Infrared is a form of light that is not visible to the 
human eye, and it got its nomenclature from the fact 
that this light goes beyond the visible spectrum and it 
begins with the colour red (700nm) and the extension 
spans up to 1000000nm [19]. (IR) is a form of 
electromagnetic wave that could be found between 
the visible light and the Microwave with 
wavelengths between 750nm and 1mm and 
frequencies between THz and 300GHz [20]. The 
infrared just like the (Ultrasonic) X-ray is relatively 
safe because its light particles are harmful to organic 
breakdown [19, 20]. IR is used in the military for 
missile weapons due to peculiar characteristics like 
cost effectiveness, high recognition ability etc. [21].  
 
4.4. Near Field Communication (NFC) 
 
This technology was basically designed for 
secure payment transactions with its maximum range 
at about 20cm. Very importantly it enables a safe 
contactless two-way communication between 
supporting electronic devices, NFC devices could be 
said to operate within three operation principles, Peer 
to Peer where participating devices communicate 
within a physical proximity in other to exchange files 
and share information in a timely manner, Card 
Emulator, here participating devices communicate 
via common infrastructure while emulating smart 
cards. Then Tag Reader/ writer, the NFC enabled 
devices reads information stored on NFC tags that 
could be embedded within any device. 
 
4.5. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
 
RFID uses radio waves for automatic 
identification using RFID Tags to store and retrieve 
information. The RFID consists of three parts, the 
reader, the tag and the data system. The RFID system 
could be passive or active depending on its 
functionalities. RFID is widely used for different 
applications ranging from supply chain management 
down to security [22]. 
 
4.6. Wi-Fi 
 
Wi-Fi is a terminology that is used to categorize 
wireless networking devices that conform to the 
IEEE “802.11b” standard [22]. Wi-Fi Technology 
over the years since its emergence in the early 1980s 
has grown to become one of the prominent wireless 
LAN Standards Wi-Fi could be argued to be a 
universal, Wi-Fi operated on 2.4 GHz band which is 
an unlicensed spectrum [23]. Wi-Fi comes with 
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numerous advantages like ease of use, mobility, 
ubiquity, mobility, network management etc.[24] and 
it has got its disadvantages just like every other 
technology but with ongoing researches.   
 
4.7. ZigBee 
 
ZigBee is a wireless networking technology that 
was developed by ZigBee Alliance and this 
technology is meant for short-range applications that 
work for low-data rate [25]. ZigBee also known as 
802.15.4 [26] operates within a personal space of 
10m with maximal signal rate of 250 kb/s 
[27]ZigBee Technology can be used for a variety of 
applications because of its low price, low power 
consumption (60mW), Data rate of 250Kbps (2.4 
GHz) with distance up to 100m [26, 28-30]. In the 
medical application, the low range-powered ZigBee 
can be used in the hospital for monitoring patients 
and could be used for machine to machine 
communication and IoT. 
 
 
Table 2. Properties of Short Range Wireless Technology 
 
 
 
5. Proposed Authentication Protocol 
 
The limited communication characteristics of 
wearable devices have prompted the use of different 
short range wireless communication technology to 
transmit the data from level one (1) as shown in the 
diagram above down to level three (3) for onward 
processing and storage and this has left a major 
vulnerability at level (2) because there is an 
introduction of a broker device which could be a 
mobile phone or an app or any other supporting 
device. This broker device even as it serves its 
purpose of transmitting it could also be the weak 
point of the communication architecture. In the light 
of this challenge the proposed protocol presents a 
mutual authentication mechanism for wearables and 
their supporting devices. 
Due to the characteristics and requirements of 
mobile wearable, the proposed protocol adopted the 
functions below to address the preceding 
challenges and to justify the requirements. 
 A size compatible secure mutual authentication 
protocol that fits with the size requirement of 
mobile wearables. 
 A secure mutual authentication protocol that is 
compatible with for Short-Range Wireless 
Technology (SRWT). 
 A secure Device 2 Device mutual authentication 
protocol for participating wearable or supporting 
device. 
 A reliable Inter-Device Imprinting mechanism to 
create trust amongst participating devices in other 
to identify the untrusted device. 
 A reliable logical capability that classifies data 
based on their sensitivity to adopt a more suitable 
authentication measure. 
 A secure imprinting mechanism that allows the 
wearable device to differentiate between trusted 
and untrusted intermediate devices. 
 
 5.1. The following assumptions were made 
 
1. Due to the nature of the secure mutual 
authentication protocol, the wearable needs to have 
capabilities of performing cryptographic and logic 
operations and this is why this research proposed the 
use of a smart card technology into the wearable to 
enable these capabilities. 
2. The wearable device should have storage 
capabilities because of the credentials that would be 
used for identification and authentication and this 
feature can be achieved using the smart card also.  
3. The wearable needs to be embedded with Short-
Range Wireless Technology (SRWT) capabilities for 
transmission and communication with supporting 
and participating devices and since with the smart 
card NFC is possible, these two technologies are 
what informed the unique design of this protocol. 
 
5.2. Proposed Architecture 
 
For most wearable devices to connect to the 
internet there is the need for a broker device to 
achieve this and giving the communication range 
limitation of wearables this device would have to be 
within the communication range of the wearable 
device. In other for this communication to be 
established securely the following steps below needs 
to be followed.   
The broker device and the wearable device needs 
to establish a communication channel using the NFC 
protocol. As mentioned earlier this mechanism is 
built on existing standards and framework. 
Due to the computation capabilities of the broker 
device, it takes up the responsibility of initiating 
communication between itself, the wearable device 
and the remote server. 
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When this communication channel has been 
established between the wearable and the remote 
server, the process of authentication begins. 
The proposed authentication protocol is based on 
EAP that way we are able to define our own 
authentication mechanism.  
For the wearable the EAP messages are 
encapsulated in PPP frames as has been illustrated in 
[40] the mapping of the PPP headers with the smart 
card commands, these commands are transmitted 
using the NFC transmission radio waves between the 
wearable device and the broker device following the 
ISO-14443-4 standard. 
The broker device unencapsulates the received 
packets from the wearable device to the EAP level 
and this would be encapsulated and transmitted over 
the internet. This could be achieved both ways 
depending on the origin of the message either from 
the wearable or from the server. The remote server 
retrieves the authentication information that was 
encapsulated by the EAP. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Proposed Authentication Architecture 
6. Authentication Procedure 
  
For the proposed authentication protocol, there 
are two different authentications that will take place. 
The first would be the authentication of the wearable 
with the broker device, the second would be the 
authentication of the broker device and the remote 
server. N.B due to the fact that these two methods 
are algorithm independent, the certificate used for 
the proposed protocol is based on the X509v3 
standard where the size of the certificates would 
solely depend on the key length and the specific 
algorithm chosen. This case any smart card 
supported algorithm can be applied depending on the 
requirements of the application. 
 
6.1. Authenticating the broker device with 
the wearable device 
 
In authenticating the broker device with the 
wearable device, bearing in mind the technologies 
(self-authenticable smart card) included in the 
wearable as have been described earlier, the first step 
would involve the wearable device user to register 
with the broker device and this is achieved by Inter-
device Imprinting as described by [43]. Below are 
the steps followed to achieve or establish a 
communication channel as illustrated in Figure 4. 
1. A communication between the wearable and the 
broker device is established using NFC 
2. A pairing request is sent from the wearable 
devices to the broker device if this has not been done 
before. 
3. The broker device responds by sending some 
unique identifiable credential to the wearable device, 
this could be in the form of IMEI number or a MAC 
address SSAID etc. 
4. The data received is stored in the smart card and it 
uses the obtained information to create a private and 
public key. 
5. The digital signature and the public key certificate 
(PKC) are sent from the wearable device to the 
broker device. 
6. Finally, the broker device verifies the signature 
received and the certificate is stored if the credential 
is correct. At this point, a confirmation message is 
sent to the wearable device. 
NB. Stored data can be deleted by the wearable 
device user in an event that there is need to pair 
another device or a new device.  
The illustration above in Figure 2 shows EAP 
method of authentication during further 
communication whenever the wearable device wants 
to communicate with the broker device. 
1. To establish a communication channel between 
the wearable device and the broker device using PPP 
configuration messages through NFC. 
2. An EAP authentication message is sent from the 
wearable device prompting for an authentication 
process. 
3. A request message is then sent from broker device 
which includes a random encrypted number with the 
public key of the wearable device to the wearable 
device. 
4. The wearable device decrypts the received 
message and sends an EAP response with the 
decrypted number to the broker device. 
5. The broker device sends a confirmation if the 
received number is correct by cross checking with 
the stored number. 
6.  The process is repeated in the opposite direction. 
Process “3” is achieved using the IMEI number, 
MAC number or any unique identifiable number of 
the broker device. 
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Figure 2. Paring between the wearable device and 
the broker device 
 
Figure 3. The authentication flow between the 
wearable device and the broker device 
 
7. Mutual Authentication between the 
Wearable device and the remote server 
 
For a successful mutual authentication between 
the wearable device and the remote server using the 
proposed protocol two assumptions were made.  
 The first assumption is that the public key of the 
wearable device is known by the authentication 
server.  
 The second assumption is that the public key of 
the remote server is also known by the wearable 
device 
 
This mutual authentication would be based on a 
four-round double challenge response. 
1. For a communication channel to be established 
between the wearable device and the broker device, 
just like other process it uses the PPP configuration 
message through NFC. 
2.The wearable device sends and EAP authentication 
message to the broker device prompting the start of 
an authentication process. 
3. The broker device sends an EAP request message 
to the wearable device enabling a start of an 
authentication process. 
4. The wearable device sends an EAP response 
message with its certificate ID to the remote server, 
all these are sent through the broker device. 
5. The broker device encapsulates the received 
message and sends it to the remote server. 
6. A random number is generated by the remote 
server “rS” and this number us sent to the wearable 
device through the broker device. 
7. The packet received by the broker device from the 
remote server is unencapsulated and forwarded to the 
wearable device. 
8. In response, the wearable device generates a 
random number “rC “and encrypts the “rS” with a 
private key and in an EAP response encapsulates the 
digital signature and sends it to the wearable device 
through the broker device. 
9. The broker device encapsulates the received 
message and sends it to the remote server. 
10. To authenticate the wearable device the remote 
server checks the correctness of the digital signature 
received, if it is correct it authenticates the wearable 
device, in turn, it encrypts rC with its private key and 
in and EAP response encapsulates the digital 
signature and sends it to the wearable device through 
the broker device. 
11. The EAP packet received from the remote server 
is encapsulated and sent to the wearable device. 
12. To authenticate the remote server, the wearable 
device checks the digital signature for correctness 
and if correct it’s authenticated. A SUCCESS 
message is sent to the remote server in other to 
confirm the successful mutual authentication. 
13.This message is encapsulated by the broker 
device and sent to the remote server. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Authentication between the wearable 
device and the remote server 
 
8. Security Justification 
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In the proposed authentication protocol as laid 
out above supports some major functions as would 
be review below. 
I
2
 Inter-device Imprinting which is the first 
functionality is set to establish trust amongst 
participating devices (the wearable device and the 
broker device), this process is carried out by the user 
of the wearable device and this protects the system 
from all short range communication attacks or threat. 
This process is only done once because the 
identifiable credential is stored and for further use. 
The second functionality protects the system against 
spoof attacks and guarantees integrity of the 
communication. For the second functionality, the 
identity of the broker device is protected by the 
previously shared identifiable credential whereas the 
identity of the wearable device is protected by its 
private keys by proof of possession in relation to its 
digital certificate. This protocol enjoys the security 
properties of NFC communication and Smart card 
technology. 
For the third functionality, the protection of the 
identities between the remote server and the 
wearable device lies on the proof of possession of the 
private key in relations to their digital certificate. 
These functionalities are possible because of the 
storage and computational abilities of the smart card 
as it satisfies the systems security requirements. 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
Wearables over the last few years have become 
the next big thing when it comes to technology, with 
medical and health fitness wearables taking the lead. 
Considering the sensitivity of data and the 
commercial value of the data transmitted or stored 
with a wearable device calls for a more secure and 
robust technology to protect the privacy of these 
wearable data.  
The security of user’s medical information or 
military intelligence must be private and can never 
be over emphasized and this research work presents 
a robust authentication protocol for wearable 
technology, this protocol could be used amongst 
participating devices within the communication grid. 
This protocol presents a low overhead cost since the 
communication would be with different participating 
devices and at a very high frequency due to the real-
time nature of the generated data. This technology is 
based on a digital signature scheme while 
authenticating users using a challenge – response 
mechanism and this is flexible as provides different 
levels of protection for transmitted packets. 
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